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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the agreement of Blacker Furniture and 
Appliance Company and Blacker Furniture Company to commence 
payments under the terms of two leases with Copper State 
Leasing Company prior to delivery of the leased equipment and 
in exchange for disbursement by Copper State Leasing Company 
of the lease proceeds to the equipment vendor, constitute 
adequate consideration for the leases? 
2. Did Respondents clothe John Gray and Edward 
Graven with apparent authority sufficient to render 
Respondents liable for the loss of the lease proceeds by Gray 
and Graven? 
3. If Gray and Graven were not the agents of 
Respondents, did Respondents ratify the investment of the 
lease proceeds by Gray and Graven in a diamond ponzi scheme by 
failing to disclose such to Copper State Leasing Company when 
Respondents first learned thereof? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a consolidated action consisting of two 
cases originally filed in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County based upon the breach of two commercial 
equipment leases by separate, but related lessees, 
Copper State Leasing Company v. Blacker Appliance and 
Furniture Company, et ah, Civil No. C82-5825, and 
Copper State Leasing Company v. Blacker Furniture Company et 
al. , Civil No. C82-5826. The cases were consolidated by 
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order of the lower court on September 30, 1983, (R-79). 
Plaintiff filed a "Motion for Entry of Judgment" and 
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which were 
heard September 4, 1984. Thereafter, the lower court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and entered its order 
of dismissal on September 25, 1984, (R-117). Pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification or Determination of 
Finality of Order of Dismissal and Motion to Reconsider, 
(R-119), the lower court entered an Amended Order for Partial 
Summary Judgment on October 31, 1984, (R-126; Addendum 
No. 9), granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants only 
as to the first cause of action of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
Trial was held on the second cause of action of Plaintiff's 
Complaint on May 15, 1985, and the trial Court ruled in favor 
of Defendants on May 22, 1985, (R-150), entering its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and its Judgment on June 4, 
1985, (R-151-155; Addendum Nos. 10 and 11). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In approximately February, 1981, Gary Blacker, Fred 
Blacker, Rick Blacker, James Blacker, Kyle Blacker and T.C. 
Blacker, (hereinafter sometimes collectively the "Blackers") 
acting on information from a friend of Gary Blacker, met with 
Leslie John Gray (hereinafter "Gray"), and Edward G. Graven 
(hereinafter "Graven"), in Ogden, Utah, to discuss a potential 
investment in a system being set up by Gray and Graven by 
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which a risk-free profit allegedly could be realized from 
commodity arbitrage (i.e. the difference between the price at 
purchase and the price at resale) (hereinafter the "Arbitrage 
Program"). (Trial Transcript, hereinafter "TT" - 56, 98-99; 
Deposition of Gary Blacker-10; Deposition of James Blacker 
-5). Gary Blacker, Fred Blacker and Rick Blacker (hereinafter 
collectively sometimes the "Utah Blackers") were principals of 
Blacker Furniture Company (hereinafter "Blacker Furniture") of 
Brigham City, Utah. T.C. Blacker, Kyle Blacker and James 
Blacker (hereinafter collectively sometimes the "Idaho 
Blackers") were principals of Blacker Appliance and Furntirue 
(hereinafter "Blacker Appliance") of Caldwell, Idaho. The 
Utah Blackers and Idaho Blackers were related, but no 
corporate or ownership connection existed between Blacker 
Appliance and Blacker Furniture. (Depo. of Gary Blacker-12; 
Depo. of James Blacker-4). 
During the initial meeting with Gray and Graven, the 
Blackers were instructed in the details of the Arbitrage 
Program and were informed that computers were required to 
participate therein. (TT-57; Depo. of Gary Blacker 16; Depo. 
of James Blacker 11). After investigating the backgrounds of 
Gray and Graven, the Blackers decided to participate in the 
Arbitrage Program. (TT-100; Depo. of James Blacker - 14). The 
Blackers gave $300,000.00 to Gray and Graven, ultimately to be 
invested in the Arbitrage Program, but which was placed, with 
the Blackers1 knowledge and approval, in an "interim 
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investment" in diamonds. (TT-18,79-84, 115-121; Depo. of Gary 
Blacker-38-40; Depo. of James Blacker-25-26). The "interim 
investment" turned out to be a diamond ponzi scheme operated 
by Jon Vasilocopolous. (Depo. of Gary Blacker-52-53; Depo. of 
James Blacker-41-42). 
At the initial meeting the Blackers were not 
informed by Gray and Graven of the financing arrangements for 
the acquisition of the computers, (TT-61,102; Depo. of Gary 
Blacker -22; Depo. of James Blacker -18), however, they were 
later told by Gray that leasing companies, such as Copper 
State Leasing Company (hereinafter "Copper State"), could 
purchase the computers and then lease them to the Blackers. 
(TT-16; Depo. of John Gray 4-8; Depo. of Gary Blacker-23; 
Depo. of James Blacker-19). When the Blackers asked Gray and 
Graven why they could simply not lease the computers from Gray 
and Graven, the Blackers were informed that Gray and Graven 
were not sufficiently creditworthy to arrange any financing 
for the computers. (TT-105). This information did not deter 
the Blackers from proceeding with the Arbitrage Program. 
(TT-84, 103). Gray then represented to the Blackers that he 
and Graven, through their companies, would make the payments 
on the computer leases from profits derived from the Arbitrage 
Program or from the "interim investment," if the profits 
therefrom were sufficient. (TT-12-13, 61-62, 102; Depo. of 
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Gary Blacker-2 0; Depo. of John Gray-9-10). 
Gray and Graven next obtained credit applications 
from Copper State and submitted them to the Blackers to be 
completed• When complete, Gray and Graven returned the 
applications, corporate tax returns and financial statement 
for Blacker Furniture and Blacker Appliance, and personal 
financial statements for the Blackers to Copper State. 
(TT-62, 64-65, 104-109, 126-127; Depo. of John Gray-7-8; Depo. 
of Gary Blacker-22,24,27; Depo. of James Blacker-20; Depo. of 
Steven Beckstead-25). After reviewing the applications and 
supporting material from the Blackers and after completing 
customary credit evaluations, an agent of Copper State 
informed Gray and Graven that Copper State would not lease 
computers to the Blackers or their business entities solely 
for the Arbitrage Program, but would lease them only to 
qualified applicants using the computers in the ordinary 
course of their business. (TT-125-126). Thereafter, and in 
furtherance of the Blackers1 application for credit from 
Copper State, the Blackers, Gray and Graven represented to 
Copper State that the Blackers would be using the computers in 
their furniture and appliance businesses. (TT-130-131; Depo. 
of Steven Beckstead-7-8). Specifically, the computers would 
be used to track accounts payable and receivable and to 
monitor inventory. (TT-125, 130-31; Depo. of Steven 
Beckstead-7-8). Copper State, in reliance upon these 
representations by Blackers, Gray and Graven, approved the 
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Blackers1 credit applications for leases of computer equipment 
and supplied to Blackers the commercial leases and personal 
guaranty agreements to be executed by the Blackers, Blacker 
Furniture and Blacker Appliance, (TT - 131-132; Depo. of 
Steven Beckstead-7-8). 
On or about June 10, 1981, in the offices of Gray 
and Graven in Ogden, Gary Blacker, on behalf of Blacker 
Furniture, executed the commercial lease agreement provided by 
Copper State (Addendum No. 1) and the Utah Blackers executed 
personal guaranty agreements, guarantying performance of the 
Blacker Furniture lease. (TT-129; Depo. of Gary Blacker-32-33; 
Depo. of Fred Blacker-3-5; Depo. of Rick Blacker-3-4; Depo. of 
Steven Beckstead-7-8). During this meeting the Utah Blackers, 
Gray, and Graven represented to agents of Copper State that 
the computer would be used primarily in the course of the 
business of Blacker Furniture, contrary to their real and 
predetermined intent to use the computer almost exclusively in 
the Arbitrage Program. They also did not disclose that Gray 
and Graven had agreed with the Utah Blackers to make the lease 
payments to Copper State. (TT-130-131; Depo. of Gary 
Blacker-50; Depo. of John Gray-37). 
On August 26, 1981, T.C. Blacker, on behalf of 
Blacker Appliance executed the second commercial lease 
agreement provided by Copper State and the Idaho Blackers 
executed personal guaranty agreements, guarantying performance 
of the Blacker Appliance lease. (TT-112-113; Addendum 
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No. 5; Depo. of James Blacker 38-40). However, prior to the 
delivery of the computers to Blacker Furniture and Blacker 
Appliance and even prior to the execution of the Blacker 
Appliance lease, the Blackers, through Gray and Graven, 
requested that Copper State disburse the funds to the computer 
vendor, Cowboy Computers. (TT-75-76, 114-115, 135; Depo. of 
Gary Blacker-34, 71; Depo. of James Blacker-26-27, 30-31). 
The explanation for this request was that Data General, the 
manufacturer of the computers, would not build or ship the 
computers until it had received payment. (TT-75-75; Depo. of 
James Blacker-31). Because this request was contrary to its 
normal business practice, Copper State instructed Gray and 
Graven that it would disburse to the computer vendor only if 
the Blackers explicitly and in writing agreed that lease 
payments would begin within one month after disbursement of 
the proceeds of the leases and that Blackers would assume 
responsibility for delivery of the computers. (TT-13 5-13 6; 
Depo. of Steven Beckstead-18-2 0). 
On June 22, 1981, Gary Blacker executed a document 
previously provided by Copper State in connection with the 
Blacker Furniture lease entitled "Acceptance of Equipment and 
Approval for Payment of Invoices," (hereinafter sometimes 
"Acceptance") to which the following language had been added 
by the Utah Blackers: "Please disburse money to Cowboy 
Computers prior to delivery. We understand that this will 
initiate the lease and payments will start July 20, 1981. We 
-7-
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Blacker Appliance desired Copper State to release the funds 
prior to the delivery of the equipment. (TT-13 6; Depo. 
of James Blacker-40-41; Depo. of Steven Beckstead-18-19). Mr. 
Beckstead specifically instructed T.C. Blacker that payments 
required under the lease with Blacker Appliance would commence 
after disbursement by Copper State, even though the equipment 
may not then be available to Blacker Appliance. (Depo. of 
Steven Beckstead-18-19). In this conversation Mr. Blacker 
approved the early disbursement of the money to Cowboy 
Computers, (TT-136-37; Depo. of James Blacker-40-41; Depo. of 
Steven Beckstead-19), and Mr. Beckstead noted the same on the 
Acceptance document. (TT-136-37; Addendum No. 6). On August 
28, 1981, Copper State disbursed funds to Cowboy Computer 
pursuant to the requests from the Blackers for early 
disbursement in the total amount of $84,000.00; $42,000.00 per 
lease. (TT-133; Addendum Nos. 4 and 8). 
After receiving the funds from Copper State, Cowboy 
Computers ordered the computers from Data General, (TT-27-28; 
Depo. of John Gray-2 0), but Gray and Graven somehow obtained 
the lease proceeds from Cowboy Computers and invested them in 
the Vasilocopolous diamond scheme where all of the proceeds 
were entirely lost. (TT-28-29; Depo. of John Gray-14). 
Neither Gray, Graven nor the Blackers have been able to 
recover any of the funds from the diamond scheme, (TT-40; 
Depo. of Gary Blacker-54), and because the Copper State 
proceeds were not available to pay Data General for the 
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SUMMARY r- ARGUMENTS 
1. Numercjs star. . . ..a. t- ^onfi ' ^ s as to some, of 
the most important facts at. issue herein • listed at the time 
partial summary judgment was granted. When viewed in the 
light most favorable to Copper State, the facts are in such 
obvious and irreconcilable dispute that summary judgment was 
patently improper. Assuming, arguendo, that the lower court 
properly found no genuine issue as to the material facts, 
judgment was not proper as a matter of law. 
The parties initially bargained for a standard 
commercial lease arrangement - when the computers were 
delivered by the vendor, and after Copper State had paid the 
vendor the purchase price thereof, the Blackers would have the 
use thereof in exchange for lease payments. However, the 
Blackers subsequently requested a modification to the 
agreement. They requested that Copper State disburse the 
lease proceeds in advance of the delivery of the computers by 
the vendor and in exchange promised to initiate the leases and 
begin to make lease payments. When Copper State accepted, a 
new, modified agreement existed. This new agreement was 
supported by consideration and when Copper State disbursed the 
lease proceeds as agreed, the Blackers got exactly what they 
had negotiated and bargained for. Subsequent non-payment by 
the Blackers constituted a breach of a valid bilateral 
contract. Thus, the law does not support judgment in favor of 
the Blackers on the theory that the consideration for the 
leases failed. 
2. The Blackers conducted virtually all of their 
negotiations and dealings with Copper State through Gray and 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS ON COPPER STATE'S 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION SEEKING RECOVERY UNDER THE 
LEASE AGREEMENTS BECAUSE NUMEROUS GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE HEARING AND 
BECAUSE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT T^JT-TT— - -n JUDGMENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW 
^• The standard for summar y judgment uii review 
Upon review by the Utah Supreme Court of an order 
granting summary judgment in the court below, the Supreme 
Court applies the same standard as the trial court. 
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). Rule 56(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
This Court has recently held that "[a] motion for 
summary judgment can only be granted when there is 'no genuine 
issue as to any material fact,1 and 'even assuming the facts 
as asserted by the party moved against to be true, he could 
not prevail. Ifl Gadd v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah 
1984) . It is only when the facts are undisputed and but one 
reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues 
become questions of law. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Heatherby 
Insurance Co., 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). The Court further 
articulated the rule in Mountain States Tel, and 
Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1984): 
Therefore, under Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P., 
summary judgment can be granted only if the record 
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any 
mateirial fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Doubts, 
uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of 
fact must be construed in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing summary judgment . . . The trial 
court must not weigh evidence or assess credibility. 
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Id * + «e Webster v. Sill; 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 
1983) . 
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i& ent i +- - t * - v - . .,t.... *. 
J* . _ 
Seagull .. -L^t.^ -*.-- * 
. o J u C o w L. i.iO L- c: j_ i o. i. i a t i.. ueiuie the 
district court at the time partial summary judgment 
was granted. 
Numerous i ssues i.'t material tact existed at the time 
the lower com rt granted pa rt i a1 summary j udgment against 
C~rr r.~ - - " a 
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financing for the Black*-rr \~ "—' ~ * i 
(Depo. of Steven Bc^cstead-* . -i 
Gray-4-8) and all pertinent information supplied by 
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the Blackers concerning creditworthiness, such as 
tax returns, applications and financial statements, 
was obtained and delivered to Copper State by Gray 
and Graven. (Depo. of John Gray-7-8; Depo. of Gary 
Blacker-22,24,27; Depo. of John Beckstead-25). Gray 
and Graven were the ones that followed-up with 
Copper State to monitor the 
application process; few if any inquiries were made 
by the Blackers. (Depo. of Gary Blacker-34,49; Depo. 
of James Blacker-2 0,56). The only meeting ever held 
where representatives of Copper State meet with any 
of the Blackers was in the offices of Gray and 
Graven. (Depo. of Gary Blacker-32-33; Depo. of 
Steven Beckstead-7-8). And when the Blackers 
desired early disbursement of the lease proceeds, 
the request was funnelled through Gray and Graven, 
(Depo. of Gary Blacker-3 4; Depo. of James 
Blacker-26-27,30-31), who instructed the Blackers 
concerning the language which should be added to the 
Acceptances. (TT-114; Depo. of James Blacker-30). 
b. The Blackers: Gray and Graven represented that 
Copper State was providing financing for other 
participants in the Arbitrage Program and was very 
familiar with its operation. Gray and Graven 
assured the Blackers that their contacts at Copper 
State would enable them to move the financing along 
-15-
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These representations werp repeated 'T*- and 
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representative- Copper State- *!~*-* Blacker;^ i:i 
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Depn. tevar; ^ vuite,..;- - ~Q) , 
The Blackers: :h«. manner in which the 
computers were to be used was of no significance to 
Copper State. In the meeting with agents of Copper 
State and Gray and Graven, there was a discussion 
regarding use of the computers in their businesses 
but no one represented that the computers were 
intended primarily for those purposes. 
(3) Whether or not Copper State was informed prior to 
disbursement of the lease proceeds that Gray and Graven had 
agreed with the Blackers that they would make all payments on 
the leases; 
a. Copper State: No person ever informed any of 
its officers or agents that Gray and Graven had 
promised to make all payments on the computer 
leases. (Depo. of Gary Blacker-50; Depo. of John 
Gray-37). 
b. The Blackers: Copper State must have been 
aware of the agreement between the Blackers and Gray 
and Graven because no one from Copper State ever 
contacted them about non-payment until six months 
after the leases were in default; all previous 
inquiries from Copper State had been with Gray and 
Graven. 
(4) Whether or not the Blackers knew or should have known at 
the time of the disbursement of funds by Copper State that all 
or part of such funds would be invested by Gray and Graven in 
the Vasicopolous diamond scheme in which the Blackers had 
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payments and assume responsibility for delivery. 
(TT-135-3 6). Copper State required this agreement 
by Blacker Furniture to be in writing before it 
would disburse. (Addendum No. 2; Depo. of Steven 
Beckstead-18-2 0). Gary Blacker supervised the 
inclusion of the additional language setting forth 
the new terms in the Acceptance and the clear 
language places the burden of delivery upon Blacker 
Furniture. (Addendum No. 2; Depo. of Gary 
Blacker-33-34). 
b. Blacker Furniture: Despite the clear language 
added to the Acceptance by Blacker Furniture, which 
language was added only after the Blackers had 
requested a modification of the lease terms, Gary 
Blacker understood from the other terms of the lease 
agreement that Copper State was obligated to provide 
the computer, and that lease payments would not 
commence until after delivery. 
(6) Whether or not T.C. Blacker understood that Blacker 
Appliance was assuming responsibility for delivery of the 
computer equipment in executing the Acceptance with the 
additional language added by him; 
a. Copper State: As with Blacker Furniture, 
Copper State required that the agreement with 
Blacker Appliance concerning early disbursement be 
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in writing. (Addendum No. 6; Depo. of Steven 
Beckstead-18-20). T.C. Blacker reviewed the terms 
of the new agreement which was added to the 
Acceptance by Blacker Appliance. (Addendum No. 6; 
Depo. of James Blacker-4 0; Depo. of Steven Beckstead 
18-19). Because the language added to the 
Acceptance by Blacker Appliance was not express as 
to delivery, Steven Beckstead called T.C. Blacker on 
the telephone to discuss this requirement. In this 
conversation T.C. Blacker told Steven Beckstead that 
he understood that Blacker Appliance was responsible 
to make payments prior to delivery. (Depo. of Steven 
Beckstead-18-19). 
b. Blacker Appliance: T.C. Blacker understood 
from the other terms of the lease agreement that 
Copper State was obligated to provide the computer. 
(7) Whether or not Copper State knew that the lease proceeds 
paid to Cowboy Computers would end up in the hands of Gray and 
Graven; 
a. Copper State: Copper State had no knowledge 
of any connection between Cowboy Computers and Gray 
and Graven. (Depo. of Steven Beckstead-12). The 
invoices from Cowboy Computers bore an address in 
Chicago, Illinois, and otherwise revealed no 
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connection to Gray or Graven. (Addendum Nos. 3 and 
7). 
b. The Blackers: Copper State must have known of 
the connection between Gray and Graven and Cowboy 
Computers because the invoices for the two computers 
from Cowboy Computers were allegedly delivered to 
Copper State by Graven. 
(8) Whether or not the Blackers, or any of them, notified 
Copper State at the time the Blackers discovered that the 
funds received from Copper State had been invested in the 
diamond investment scheme; 
a. Copper State: It was not until well after the 
leases were in default and after the collapse of the 
Vasicopolous ponzi scheme that Copper State learned 
how the proceeds had been lost, although the 
Blackers had discovered it some months before (Depo. 
of James Blacker-42). At this point there was 
nothing Copper State could do to recover any portion 
of the funds. 
b. Blackers: Because Gray and Graven did make one 
payment to Copper State on the leases, and because 
there must have bf:en some discussions with Gray and 
Graven after disbursement to Cowboy Computers, 
Copper State should have known of the improper use 
of the lease proceeds. 
Copper State has enumerated above numerous 
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significant conflicts in some of the most important facts at 
issue in this action. As to several critical issues the 
position adopted by the Blackers is diametrically opposed to 
the facts upon which Copper State relied. For instance, 
Blacker Furniture asserted that it was not obligated to make 
payments under its lease until after the computer was 
delivered. This assertion is made even though the Blackers 
made a request that the lease proceeds be disbursed 
prior to delivery, negotiated new terms and then Gary Blacker 
personally supervised the addition of language to the 
Acceptance which stated clearly and unambiguously that 
disbursement of the lease proceeds would initiate the lease 
and payments would commence on September 25, 1981. Such 
disputed material facts cannot properly exist when summary 
judgment is granted. Moreover, many conclusions can be drawn 
from other material facts which are not so obviously 
contradictory. The requirement that only one reasonable 
conclusion must flow from the facts was ignored by the lower 
court. See FMA Acceptance Co. v. Heatherby 
Insurance Co., supra. In addition, when uncertainties or 
doubts as to certain facts are confronted, they are generally 
more easily resolved in favor cf Copper State than in the 
favor of the Blackers. 
When viewed as a whole, the material facts were in 
obvious and irreconcilable dispute at the time partial summary 
judgment was granted. Thus, the granting of partial summary 
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judgment by the lower court in the face of so many genuine 
issues of material fact was clearly error and contrary to the 
language of Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. This Court should reverse 
the order of the lower court granting partial summary judgment 
in favor of the Blackers and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
C. The Blackers were not entitled to partial summary 
judgment as a matter of law 
Assuming, argendo, that the trial court properly 
found no genuine issue as to any material fact in granting 
Blackers1 motion for summary judgment, that court erred in 
ruling that the Blackers were entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. Pursuant to the rules pronounced by this Court 
in Gadd v. Olson, supra, and Mountain States Tel, and Tel. 
Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, supra, the lower 
court was obligated to view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to Copper 
State, and with that view apply the law to those facts and 
inferences. When that perspective is adopted, it is clear 
that the law does not favor the Blackers but rather would 
support judgment in favor of Copper State. 
Neither the minute entry of September 5, 1984, 
granting the Blackers1 Motion for Summary Judgment nor the 
order submitted pursuant thereto reveals the basis upon which 
the lower court ruled in granting the motion (R. 116) . A 
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review of the Transcript of Proceedings of the summary 
judgment hearing dated September 4, 1984, however, clearly 
indicates that the lower court based its ruling upon two 
recent Utah Supreme Court cases, Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, 656 
P.2d 454 (Utah 1982); and FMA Financial Corp, v. Hansen Dairy, 
Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980). 
In FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen Diary, Inc., supra 
the Court held that where a dairy farm corporation had 
executed a commercial lease for a corn silo which was never 
installed as and when contemplated by the parties to the 
lease, the dairy corporation was not estopped from claiming 
that the failure to install the silo as agreed constituted 
failure of consideration, rendering the lease unenforceable. 
Id. at 33 0. The Court so held, notwithstanding that an 
officer of the lessee corporation had executed and delivered 
to the plaintiff lessor an acceptance notice which provided 
that "the items received by us . . . were and are in good 
order and condition and acceptable to us as delivered or 
installed." Id. at 328. 
The parties in Hansen Dairy expressly agreed upon 
delivery and installation of the corn silo before harvest 
time. Delivery and installation of the silo was a principal 
object of the agreement which was not changed by the 
subsequent execution of the acceptance notice by the dairy. 
This Court reasoned that the lessor knew that the silo had not 
been completed when it received the acceptance notice, which 
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knowledge defeated the lessor's claim of an estoppel. Id. at 
3 29-30. In affirming the lower court's conclusion that the 
failure to deliver and install a completed silo by harvest 
time constituted failure of consideration, this Court found 
that ample evidence existed to support the trial court's 
finding that the timely delivery and installation of the silo 
was one of the underlying bases of the parties' agreement. Id. 
at 33 0. 
In Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, supra, this Court held 
that where computer equipment delivered to lessees under a 
commercial lease was not the equipment contemplated under the 
lease agreement, the delivery of the wrong equipment 
constituted a failure of consideration sufficient to render 
the lease unenforceable. Id. at 457. In Nielsen, the lessees 
brought suit to rescind the lease agreement based upon the 
fact that the computer equipment specified in the lease had 
not been delivered to them; the computers actually delivered 
bore serial numbers different from those specified in the 
lease agreement and a third party subsequently asserted a 
valid security interest in the computers. In affinning the 
ruling of the district court, this Court noted that the fact 
that an "acknowledgement" was signed by the lessees 
acknowledging delivery of the equipment was not sufficient to 
overcome the lessor's duty to inspect the equipment and 
ascertain that it was the same equipment referred to in the 
lease, especially where the lessor's agent had had an 
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opportunity to inspect the equipment and failed to do so. Id. 
at 456. The Court found it significant that the 
"acknowledgment" executed by the lessees was merely a standard 
"boilerplate" provision in the lease. Id. The Supreme Court 
futher noted that the trial court had specifically based its 
ruling on the fact that the equipment specified in the lease 
was not delivered and reasoned that the parties bargained for 
the delivery of specific equipment, which the lessor failed to 
do. Id. at 457. 
The analysis of Nielsen and Hansen Dairy set forth 
above reveals that these cases reiterate the long-standing 
rule that if a party to a valid bilateral contract refuses or 
is unable to perform as agreed, the promise of the other party 
is unenforceable. Thus, in both of these cases the lessors 
could not recover for non-payment by the lessees because the 
lessors had either delivered the wrong equipment or none at 
all. This refusal or inability of the lessors to perform was 
a failure of consideration. Nielsen v. Ricter, 20 Cal. App. 
2d. 546, 67 P.2d 353 (1937); see Corbin on Contracts, 
Consideration, Section 33, p. 193. 
Copper State readily acknowledges that if the facts 
in the instant case stopped with the execution of leases and 
non-delivery of equipment, as in Nielsen and Hansen Dairy, the 
rule cited above would apply and the leases would be 
unenforceable - the Blackers never got the computer equipment 
described in the leases. But that is not what the Blackers 
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bargained for in their agreement with Copper State. What was 
bargained for, and what Copper State delivered under the 
leases, was disbursement of the lease proceeds prior to 
delivery of the computer equipment. 
In this action, the pertinent facts are that Blacker 
Furniture and Blacker Appliance desired to enter into two 
separate leases for identical computer equipment. The 
standard lease agreements utilized by Copper State provided at 
paragraph 5 that Copper State purchase the equipment from a 
vendor specified by the Blackers and that the Blackers agreed 
"to arrange for delivery of the equipment." (Addendum Nos. 
1 and 5). An Acceptance had to be executed and delivered to 
Copper State "before payment can be made to supplier." 
(Addendum Nos. 2 and 6). The standard Acceptance provided 
by Copper State specified that the leased equipment had "been 
delivered to the Lessee in good repair and condition" at the 
time of execution. (Id.) Thus, as a term of all of its 
standard lease agreements and as intended with the Blackers, 
before Copper State would disburse to the equipment vendor the 
Blackers would have to agree with Copper State that they had 
received the equipment in good repair and condition. 
As initially prepared by Copper State for the 
Blackers, the standard lease documents reflect that the 
Blackers had bargained for the delivery and use of computer 
equipment and that delivery would initiate the obligation of 
the Blackers to make lease payments. Thereafter, however, the 
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deal changed. 
Prior to the delivery of the computer equipment to 
the Blackers, the Blackers requested through their agents, 
Gray and Graven, that Copper State immediately disburse the 
funds to the computer vendor, Cowboy Computers. (TT-75-76, 
114-115, 135; Depo. of Gary Blacker-34; Depo. of James 
Blacker-26-27, 30-31.). In response to this request, Copper 
State informed Gray and Graven that Copper State would agree 
to disburse the lease proceeds only if the Blackers explicitly 
and in writing agreed that the lease terms would thereby be 
initiated and payments commence thereafter. (TT-135-3 6; Depo. 
of Steven Beckstead-18-19). 
On June 22, 1981, Blacker Furniture executed an 
Acceptance (Addendum No. 2) with regard to its lease to which 
it added the following language: 
"Please disburse money to Cowboy Computers prior to 
delivery. We understand this will initiate the 
lease and payments will start Setpember 25, 1981. 
We take full responsibility for delivery of the 
equipment." 
On or about August 26, 1981, Blacker Appliance 
executed an Acceptance (Addendum No. 6) to which the following 
language was added by Blacker Appliance: 
"Disburse money to Cowboy Computer prior to delivery 
of computer. We understand that this will initiate 
the lease and payments which [sic] will start one 
month from date of funding." 
On August 27, 1981, and after receipt of each 
Acceptance described above, Appellant disbursed $42,000.00 to 
Cowboy Computers under the terms of the Blacker Furniture 
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lease. (Addendum No. 4). On or about August 28, 1981, 
Appellant disbursed $42,000.00 to Cowboy Computers under the 
terms of the Blacker Appliance lease. (Addendum No. 8). 
Subsequently, and as previously set forth, Gray and Graven 
invested and lost the entire amount disbursed by Copper State 
in the Vasicopolous ponzi scheme. (TT-28-29; Depo. of John 
Gray-14). 
Copper States asserts that when the Blackers 
requested early disbursement of the lease proceeds, at a time 
when all parties were aware that the equipment had not even 
been built or shipped, they initiated a process to modify the 
terms of the agreements between the parties. Whereas under 
the initial lease agreement, as prepared by Copper State, the 
parties had bargained for delivery and use of computers in 
exchange for rental payments from the Blackers to Copper 
State, the subsequent modifications resulted in an agreement 
between the parties requiring Copper State to disburse the 
lease proceeds prior to delivery of the equipment in exchange 
for the immediate initiation of the lease terms and the 
commencement of lease payments by the Blackers. 
In Utah, parties are free to renegotiate and modify 
the terms of a written agreement, notwithstanding recitals in 
the agreements to the contrary, and the new terms of the 
agreement will govern the parties1 performance. See Prince 
v. R.C. Tolman Const. Co., 610 P.2d 1267 (Utah 1980); Rapp 
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 606 P.2d 1180 (Utah 1980). 
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In PLC Landscape Const, v. Picadilly Fish Nf Chips, 28 Utah 
2d, 350, 502 P.2d 562 (1972), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
. . . there is nothing so sacrosanct about having 
entered into one agreement that it will prevent the 
parties entering into any such change, modification, 
extension or addition to their arrangement for doing 
business with each other that they mutually agree. 
. . . such subsequent agreements are governed by the 
same rules as to proof and enforceability as the 
original agreement. 
Id. at 563. Any change or modification, however, is "governed 
by the same rules as to proof and enforceability as the 
original agreement." Id. For that reason, there must be new 
consideration for the amendment, change or addition. Liberty 
Mutual Fire Ins. v. Hubbard, 551 P.2d 1288 (Ore. 1976); 
Rosellini v. Bauchero, 83 Wash.2d 268, 517 P.2d 955 (1974); 
Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. Peck, 520 P.2d 87 (Alaska 
1974) . 
As consideration for the proposed amendment, the 
Blackers offered to initiate the leases immediately upon 
disbursement to Cowboy Comptuers and to commence rental 
payments thereunder even through the computer equipment would 
not have then been delivered. This promise constituted 
consideration for the modifications - there was a detriment to 
the Blackers (th^y would have to begin making payments under 
the leases before the computer equipment was actually 
delivered) and a benefit to Copper State (it would begin to 
receive payments from the Blackers under the leases sooner 
than anticipated). Stovall v. Williams, 100 Ariz. 1, 409 P.2d 
711 (1966); Cheney v. Rucher, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 
(1963). Copper State then exercised its power of acceptance 
by communicating to the Blackers its promise to disburse funds 
to Cowboy Computers. This process resulted in a modification 
to the existing, valid leases. The necessary consideration 
for the modification was the initiation of the leases and the 
commencement of monthly payments thereunder. When Copper 
State subsequently did as agreed and disbursed the proceeds of 
the leases to Cowboy Computers, the Blackers were then bound 
by the terms of the leases, as modified, and obligated to make 
monthly payments. Their failure to do so was a breach of the 
terms of the leases. 
The analysis set forth above plainly reveals the 
inapplicability of Nielsen and Hansen Dairy. In each of those 
cases the lessees1 binding promise to pay became unenforceable 
by reason of the lessors1 refusal or inability to provide the 
leased equipment. Because of some supervening cause the 
lessors1 promised performance failed. See General Ins. Co. 
of Americci v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P. 2d 502 (Utah 
1976); see 1 Williston on Contracts (3d Ed.) Section 119A, 
p.490. Because the lessors defaulted on their part of the 
bargain, the leases became unenforceable for failure of 
consideration. 
Failure of consideration is wholly inappropriate in 
the instant case. Here, the Blacker1s binding promise to pay 
was enforceable by reason of Copper State's disbursement of 
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the lease proceeds to Cowboy Computers. There was no failure 
of consideration because Copper State performed precisely as 
it promised and the Blackers got exactly what they bargained 
for - the disbursement of the lease proceeds to Cowboy 
Computers prior to delivery of the computer equipment. The 
sole unperformed obligations of the modified lease agreements 
are those of the Blackers. 
In Nielsen and Hansen Dairy the bargained for 
consideration (delivery of the leased equipment) did fail 
through some supervening cause. In the present case the 
consideration for the lease agreements, as modified, did not 
fail at all. Under the law governing the present case the 
Blackers were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
The rules laid down in Nielsen and Hansen Dairy are simply not 
applicable to the facts here, and the order of the lower court 
granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Blackers was 
error. The Supreme Court should reverse the order of the 
lower court granting the Blackers1 motion. 
POINT II 
THE BLACKERS CLOTHED GRAY AND GRAVEN WITH 
APPARENT AUTHORITY SUFFICIENT TO RENDER THE BLACKERS 
LIABLE FOR THE LOSS OF THE LEASE PROCEEDS DISBURSED 
BY COPPER STATE 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Walker Bank and Trust Co. 
v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73 (Utah 1983), recognized the principal of 
apparent authority, stating that "apparent authority exists: 
[W]here a person has created such an appearance of things that 
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it causes a third party reasonably and prudently to believe 
that a second party has the power to act on behalf of the 
first person . . .." Id. at 75 (citing Wynn v. McMahon Ford 
Co., Mo.App., 414 S.W. 2d 330, 336 (1967)). In Walker Bank, 
the Court held that customers of a bank had created the 
appearance of apparent authority by requesting that the bank 
extend credit to their spouses through the use of credit cards 
issued by the bank. The Court found that, although letters 
had been sent by the customers notifying the bank that the 
spouses were no longer "authorized" to use their cards, the 
apparent authority of the spouses did not cease upon such 
notice. Id. at 75. 
The creation of the appearance of authority by one 
person for another to act in that person's name creates a 
relationship of agency such that acts performed by the agent, 
which are within the apparent scope of that agent's authority, 
will be binding upon the principal. See Forsyth v. Pendleton, 
617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980); Skerl v. Willowcreek Coal Co., 
69 P.2d 502, 505-06 (Utah 1937). As the court stated in 
Forsyth v. Pendleton: "principals are bound by the acts of 
their agents which are within the apparent scope of the 
authority of the agent and a principal will not be permitted 
to deny such authority against third parties who have relied 
on the authority." 617 P.2d at 360. 
In the present case, the Blackers created the 
appearance of authority on the part of Gray and Graven by 
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meeting with representatives of Copper State at the offices of 
Gray and Graven and by permitting Gray and Graven thereafter 
to conduct business on their behalf. (TT-71-73, 129-133, 
134-136; Depo. of Steven Beckstead-5-8). More specifically, 
Gray and Graven delivered all financial data and the lease 
applications to Copper State. (TT-62, 64-65, 104-109, 126-127; 
Depo. of John Gray-7-8; Depo. of Gary Blacker-22, 24, 27; 
Depo. of James Blacker-2 0). They made all follow-up 
inquiries to Copper State concerning the status of the 
applications. (Depo. of Gary Blacker-39, 49; Depo. of James 
Blacker-2 0, 56). Gray and Graven conducted the meeting when 
it was represented by them that the computers were intended 
primarily for the Blackers1 businesses, which representations 
the Blackers did not contradict. (TT-130-131; Depo. of Steven 
Beckstead-7-8). Finally, it was Gray and Graven that 
negotiated with Copper State the terms whereby the leases 
would be disbursed prior to delivery of the equipment. (Depo. 
of Gary Blacker-34; Depio. of James Blacker-26-27, 30-31). 
When viewed as a whole, all of these facts clearly 
reveal that the Blackers clothed Gray and Graven with apparent 
authority to act as agents for them. Having created such an 
appearance of authority by entrusting all pertinent terms of 
the transaction to the care of Gray and Graven, Copper State 
reasonably believed that Gray and Graven had power to act for 
and bind the Blackers, Blacker Appliance and Blacker 
Furniture. The creation of this appearance of authority by 
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the Blackers should bind them for the acts of Gray and Graven 
in the investment of the lease proceeds in the Vasilocopolous 
diamond scheme. The Blackers should not be allowed to escape 
liability for repayment of the proceeds by denial of the 
agency of Gray and Graven. 
In addition to binding the Blackers for the 
consequences of the investment of the lease proceeds in the 
Vasilocopolous diamond scheme, Blackers are bound by the 
misrepresentations made by Gray and Graven to Copper State 
regarding the purposes for which the proceeds were meant and 
regarding the use of the proceeds in connection with the 
ordering of the computers from Data General. As in 
Walker Bank, the Blackers should be bound by the actions of 
Gray and Graven in investing the proceeds disbursed by Copper 
State and in misrepresenting to Copper State the true state of 
the facts. The trial court erred in ruling that the Blackers 
did not clothe Gray and Graven with apparent authority based 
upon the evidence before the trial court at the trial of this 
action. (R-152; Addendum No. 10). Through the appearance 
created by the Blackers that Gray and Graven were authorized 
to act, and did act, on behalf of the Blackers, the Blackers 
clearly clothed Gray and Graven with apparent authority 
sufficient to bind them, as principals, for the acts of Gray 
and Graven, their agents. The decision of the trial court 
should be reversed and the matter remanded for further 
proceedings. 
-35-
POINT III 
THE BLACKERS RATIFIED THE ACTIONS OF 
GRAY AND GRAVEN SUFFICIENT TO RENDER THE BLACKERS 
LIABLE FOR THE LOSS OF THE LEASE PROCEEDS 
DISBURSED BY COPPER STATE 
Even if the Court determines that the Blackers did 
not clothe Gray and Graven with apparent authority, the 
Blackers should be bound by the acts of Gray and Graven 
through the doctrine of ratification. The Utah Supreme Court 
has recognized that a principal may be bound by the acts of an 
agent where, though the acts were unauthorized at the time 
they were taken, the principal knowingly ratifies them. 
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982); 
Zeese v. the Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah 1975); 
Lowe v. April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 
1974). In Bradshaw v. McBride, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A principal may impliedly or expressly ratify an 
agreement made by an unauthorized agent. 
Ratification of an agent's acts relates back to the 
time the unauthorized act occurred and is sufficient 
to create the relationship of principal and agent. . 
. . a deliberate and valid ratification with full 
knowledge of all the material facts is binding and 
cannot afterward be revoked or recalled, 
however, a ratification required the principal to 
have knowledge of all material facts and an intent 
to ratify. . . . under some circumstances failure 
to disaffirm may constitute ratification of the 
agent's acts. 
Id. at 78 (citations omitted). The Court went on to cite 
language from an earlier Utah case, Moses v. Archie McFarland 
and Son, 119 Utah at 607, 230 P.2d at 573-74: 
. . . even silence with full knowledge of the facts 
may manifest affirmance and thus operate as a 
ratification. . . • so a purported principal may 
not be willfully ignorant, nor may he purposely shut 
his eyes to means of information within his 
possession and control and thereby escape 
ratification 'if the circumstances are such that he 
could reasonably have been expected to dissent 
unless he were willing to be a party the 
transaction.f 
Id. at 573-74; Lowe v. April Industries, Inc., supra at 299. 
The Blackers had invested $300,000.00 in the 
Vasilocopolous ponzi scheme before they requested that the 
lease proceeds be disbursed to Gray and Graven, (TT-18, 79-84, 
115-121; Depo. of Gary Blacker-38-40; Depo. of James 
Blacker-25-26), and they knew or reasonably should have known 
that if Gray and Graven received the lease proceeds prior to 
the time they were required by the computer manufacturer, such 
funds would also be invested in the ponzi scheme. Further, 
the Blackers discovered, within a relatively short time after 
the proceeds had been disbursed by Copper State that such 
proceeds had been invested by Gray and Graven in the 
Vasilocopolous diamond scheme. (TT-88; Depo. of James 
Blacker-42-45; Depo. of John Gray 15,31,34). In view of the 
representations of the Blackers, Gray and Graven regarding the 
primary purpose for which the proceeds from Copper State were 
to be used, (TT-129-136; Depo. of Steven Beckstead-5-8), the 
Blackers had a duty to inform Copper State that the proceeds 
had been diverted to other purposes. The failure of the 
Blackers to so notify Copper State, having "full knowledge of 
the facts" or "information within [their] possession or 
control" manifested an affirmance on the part of the Blackers 
of the actions of Gray and Graven. Such an affirmance acts as 
a ratification by the Blackers of the investment of the 
proceeds in the diamond scheme and renders the Blackers liable 
to Copper State for the loss of the proceeds. 
The trial court erred in ruling that the Blackers 
did not ratify the acts of Gray and Graven based upon the 
evidence before it during the trial of this action. In light 
of the Blackers1 full knowledge of the facts or their 
possession or control of critical information and their 
consequent duty to inform Copper State of the diversion of the 
proceeds to the diamond scheme, the Blackers clearly ratified 
the acts of Gray and Graven rendering them liable to Copper 
State as principals. 
CONCLUSION 
Copper State respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the order granting partial Summary Judgment (R. 
126-27) and the Judgment (R. 154-55) and remand this matter to 
the lower court with instructions to enter judgment in favor 
of Copper State in the amount proved at trial. 
DATED this 6/7 day of December, 1985. 
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 
LEASE NO 16 0 2 - 0 1 -
UALWAYS REFER TO ABOVE NO) 
MAY 8L 
LEASE AGREEMENT made and entered into this 2 6 day of 19 ,^>Y and between Copper State Leasing Co., a Utah 
corporation with oldccs at 359 South Main Street, Salt Lake City. Utah 84111, ('Lessor) and ('Lesseo ) 
BLACKER FURNITURE CO. 
RT~2 
"BRICHAM CITV, UTAH 84302 
Lessor hereby leases to Lessee, and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor the following desenbod personal property (the 'Equipment') upon the lollowing 
terms and conditions 
QTY SERIAL NO EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION SUPPLIER NAME ANO AOORESS 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT" A" 
( I H this Block is checked, see Exhibit W consisting of pages attached hereto and a part hereof for Quantity. Serial Numbers, Description. Sup-
plier and other Equipment information 
The Equipment will at all times during the term ol this lease be located at the address of Lessee shown above, or at 
TERMS m> CONDITIONS Of LEASE 
1. LEASE TERM AND PAYMENT. Lessee shall pay Lessor Commencement J?A»y
 p n i y • • i y 7 j r \ ' M — r -
at its offices m Salt Lake City. Utah or at such otner piace Lease T * , ^ . l r i i R l * - o l A ^ . j j o Ij ^ Q " ' w 
as Lessor may designate in writing the periodical rental Monthly Rental Payment:* ' 4 a ? n 
payments for the term indicated' Monthly Use Tax: $ ' * • / b 
If oth*»r than monthly rental payments, the terms are as . $ 
follows (Other) " 
Total Monthly 1 , 6 5 4 . 1 5 
Rental Payment: $ -
In addition, advance payments equal to the fiist and last months rental payments in the total amount of $ / q ' -*^ 
is due and payable upon acceptance of this lease by Lessor. 
2 DECLARATION OF BUSINESS PURPOSE. Lessee hereby warrants and represents thai ihe Equipment will be used lor business purposes and not lor personal family 
household or agricultural purpose* Lessee acknowledges inat Lessor has relied upon ihis representation m entering into ihis lease 
3 CLAIMS AGAINST SUPPLIER. If Equipmeni is not properly installed 3oes not operate as represented or warranted by Supplie* or is unsatisfactory for any reason 
Lessee shall maWe any r i i im on account thereof solely against Supplier and shall nevertheless pay Lessor all rent payable under this lease Lessor will include as a con. 
dihon o« its purchase order that Supplier aqree mat all warranties iqreemems and representations if any which may be made by Supplier to Lessor may be enforced by 
Lessee m us own name Lessor hereby agrees to assiqn to Lessee and does hereby assign solely for the purpose of making and prosecuting any said claim all of the rights 
which Lessor has agamst Supplier for breach ol warranty or other representation respecting Equipment 
4 SUPPLIER NOT AN AGENT Lesseo undorsfinds and .MJHN'S mat neither Supplier nor any salesman or other agent pi Supplier is an agent of Lessor ind lhat Lessor 
is not an twent ot Supplier No salesmen n» agent ul Supplier is .lulhon/ii) to waive or ilirr any iprm or condition ol this lease and no representation as lo Equipment or any 
Other matter py Supplier snail m any way afteg Lessee s duly to pay ihe rent, and perform its other obligations as set Iprth m his lease 
5 ORDERING EQUIPMENT Lessee hr»rpDy requests Lessor to purchase the Equipment from the above named Suppiier(s) Lessor agrees to purchase the Equiomenias 
selected by Lessee and Lessee nqreos to i m n q e for delivery of Ihe equipment so lhat it can be accepted on or before ihe commencement date ol ihis lease as set forth in 
paragraph 1 above Lessee hereby authorises Lessor io insert m this lease the commencement dale idenniication numbers and other descriptive data for ihe Equipment 
6 AGREEMENT INCLUOES REVERSE SIDE HEREOF This lease including the reverse side hereof correctly sets forth the ennr» lease aqreement between Lessor and 
Lessee and no agreement or understandmq claimed by either party hereto shall be binding unless specifically set forth herein The term Lessee as used herem shall mean 
and include any and all Lessees who sign hereunder earn of whom shall be |omtty and severally bound hereby 
7 NO WARRANTIES BY LESSOfl LES'-.rF HAS 5CLF< 'CO HO fH < ,i EQUIPMENT AND Ihf SUPPjlEH mQM \VHQM I ESIQnjS TQ PljnCHASE IT LES5QP MAKES 
NQ WARHANriES EXPRESS Q3 mPt T O As l u ANY VAfTER V.H A r SOf- v £ " IN' LUQlt^G THE LQNQI HON QF ECJlPMENf US *.«£BCHAN I AH»LH V CM ITS HTNESb 
FOR ...NY P\MTI^ULAK P\JW(jbt AND AS 'Q LEbSQH LFS(3FE LEASES EQUIPMENT AS >S 
THIS LEASE ALSO INCLUDES ALL TERMS AND PROVISIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HERF.qp 
THIS LEASE CANNOT BE CANCELLED BY LESSEE. 
Aithorized Signature & Title) 
Date Executed by Lessee (tZ / C */ 
Date Accepted •**—» 
Lessee's Social Security Number or )~1 I '<% I f\ 
Emplcver's 1.0. Number: V ] - Q J / I, J > (, 
•(If Corporation, President, Vice President or 
Treasurer should sign and give official title. If 
Proprietor or Partner, state which) 
SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT NAME OF LESSEE 
BLACKER FURNITURE CO. 
RT. #2 
BRIGHAM CITY, UT 84302 
QUANITY SERIAL NO. EQUIPMENT,DESCRIPTION, MAKE, MODEL NO. 
ONE Stock number C1012 8K Which includes the following: 
16 bit central processor unit; 128KB mos memory, real 
time clock, power fail/auto restart, assembly interface, 
mult/divide ; auto program load, 12.5 MB non-removable disc, 
1.25MB discette, CRT terminal, 200 CPS printer, input 
output communications sub-assembly, multiple language 
interface, four line full or half duplex asyncr. mux., printer 
port &TTY port, applications interface and 30" 1/2 bay cabinet wi1 
desk -formica top and casters. 
LESSOR: 
COPP 
TITLE 
LZSSZZ: 
TITLE 
DATE C -W- If 
LEASE NO. 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
359 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
COMMERCIAL LEASE 
LEASE MO 2 -
(ALWAYS REFER TO ABOVE NO.) 
LEASE AGREEMENT made and entered into this ^ day of * ~ "* 19 X~by and between Copper State Leasing Co., a Utah 
corporation with offices at 359 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, ('Lessor'} and ('Lessee) 
"CTrT7~UT-C~ 
Lessor hereby leases to Lessee, and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor the following described personal property (the 'Equipment') upon the following 
terms and conditions: 
QTY. SERIAL NO. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION SUPPLIER NAME ANO AOORESS 
i.«i.- ;A':T;»CI:2D rrrnnsiT' 
£HSee Exn'bit 'A' consisting of—;—pages attached hereto and a part hereof for Quantity. Serial Numbers. Description. Supplier and other Equipment 
Tnformatiorv 
The Equipment will at ail times during the term of this lease be located at the address o» Lessee snown above, or at 
ACCEPTANCE OF EQUIPMENT ANO APPROVAL FOR PAYMENT OF INVOICES ^ 
The above equipment leased from you by the undersigned under the terms of the above-referenced lease has been delivered to the undersigned in 
good condition and repair. The undersigned accepts the equipment as satisfactory in ail respects for the purpose of the lease. The undersigned has 
examined the invoice of the vendor for the equipment and specifically requests you to pay the amount of such invoice, ($1,4 » I^» 
The undersigned further acknowledges that you have made no express or Implied warranties or representations as to the merchant* 
ability, quality, design, condition or fitness for any particular purpose of the leased property, and approves the payment_of.all invoices 
relating to this equipment.. 
If deceit or metal plate* have been supplied they have been affixed to the equipment listed above. 
PLEASE DISBURSE MONEY TO COWBOY COMPUTERS PRIOR TO 
DELIVERY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WILL INITIATE THE LEASER 
AND PAYMENTS WILL START JULY 20th, 19frTr~ S^* -L>~/??S / 3 * 
WE TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELIVERY OF Trtf EQUIPMENT. 
Date 
This acceptance and delivery must 
be completed and signed and returned . 
to Copper State Leasing Co. before payment 
can be made to supplier. 
( t ) 
LEASE-CORY COMMERCIAL 
ADDENDUM NO. 3 
Cowboy Computers LTD, 
Suite 202 
619 North State St. 
Chicago, II 60610 
INVOICE 
2538 
SOLD TO SHIP TO 
Copper State leasing Blacker Furniture Co. 
359 South Main 879 North Main 
M i l l a r d HT. S<n4fl 
Salt Lake C 
CUSTOMERS OROER 
1 
:ity, UT. 
SALESMAN 
84111 
TERMS 
Attn- Gary Bl 
SHIPPED VIA 
Best Way Padded Van 
CIO 128k Packaged system which includes: 
16 bit central processor unit; 128 kb mos memor 
real time C I O C K , power rail/auto restart, 
assembly interface, hardware mult/divide, 
auto program load, l^.b mb nonremovable dis<, 
1.25mb discette, CRT master console, 200 cps 
printer, l/u communications subassembly, 
multiple language interface, four line full or 
halt duplex asyncr. mux, printer port, M Y port 
applications interface, and 30" cabinet w/formi 
desk tap and casters. 5 user capability. 
pr\ ^—^^^r^P7 
If U <^s ~ ~' 
acker 
f oa 
Ship Point 
1 
:a 
Total 
OATE 
6-15-81 
42,000 
_ 
.00 
ADDENDUM NO. 4 
fiSL's3!^  SSSOT *mMm<} £ mm 
PAY-
ORDER 
0 OF 
i 
13 
359 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CfTY. UTAH 84111 
L. * •• :»• 
* • • * ' - • • " . " ' 
: ,»•> ; v ' - > - . i . . •; 
COWBOY COMPUTERS' t ^ . ^ ^ V ^ ^ ^ : . ; •>; - , ; 
i s - h " 
riJ.-VT S«.\*.V.J'-»i*| •; Cr»:*:.t O r 
• ALT U K E CITT. UTAH 04 
31-1/12-10 
A M O U N 
$ 
0.8-27-81 / / b2.\ 00< 
"ZZ&S&i 7^-T— ~ — r ^ - # A 
^ N D T NEGBTIA&LE 
i 
i ^ L ' G ^ ' r G i * « : i 2 l * D D C G i c « : E l 0 I L LO l.naa 
C 5 % S T E ^ • & » * « * * ^ g ^ 3 X ^ , ^ - * » V ^ *«®W. w *-* 
P A Y E E : DETACH THIS STATEMENT BEFORE DEPOSITING 
SALT tA^E OTf, UTAH 
INVOICE NO. D E S C R I P T I O N AMOUNT DISCOUNT OR DEDUCTION 
08-27-81 LEASE § 1502-01 
BLACKER BUR3ITURE CO. 
CSL 201-1 
ADDENDUM NO. 5 
359 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
COMMERCIAL LEASE 
. , . - - . 1665-01 
(ALWAYS REFER TO ABOVE NO) 
LEASE AGREEMENT made and entered into this 7 T H d a y of J U L Y 19 8 1 , by and between Copper State Leasing Co., a Utah 
corporation with offices at 359 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, ('Lessor) and (Lessee) 
ttT.APVirP APPT.TAMPTT fc FTTPM T TTTT? V OF 
T A T n\jvi T , T M T _ 
S O ? ? F A S T TT.FVF.T.ANn 
_CAT,DWF.LL. IDAHO 8 3 6 0 5 
~" Lessee 
Lessor hereby leases to Lessee, and Lessee hereby teases from Lessor the following described personal property (the Equipment) upon the following 
terms and conditions 
QTV SERIAL NO EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION SUPPLIER NAME AND ADDRESS 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A" 
j | If this Block is checked see Exhibit A consisting of pages attached hereto and a part hereof for Quantity Serial Numbers, Description. Sup-
plier and other Equipment information 
The Equipment will at all times during tt\e term ot this lease be located at the address of Lessee shown above, or at 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS Of LEASE 
1 LEASE TERM AND PAYMENT. Lessee shall pay Lessor Commencement ^ a t e ; * . — _ _ — • - • • • — — 
at its offices in Salt Lake City, Utah or at such otner piace Lease Term I n l K . l i - 5 1 ^ fc 4 o .» ^ < * " " « 
as Lessor may designate in writing the periodical rental Monthly Rental Payment S I I 
payments for the term indicated.
 M o n t h l y U i e T „ . $ 'i 7 . 2 'i 
It other than monthly rental payments the terms are as . ^ 
follows - (Other) " 
— Total Monthly 
• Rental Payment: s 1 , 6 2 1 . 8 0 
In addition, advance payments equal to the first and last U N | 1 months rental payments in the total amount of $ » J . J ? 
is due and payable upon acceptance of this lease by Lessor 
2 DECLARATION OF BUSINESS PURPOSE Lessee hereby warrants and represents that the Equipment wi l l be used for business purposes and not tor personal family 
household or aqncuiturai purposes Lessee acknowledges mat Lessor has r**lied upon this represent -won n entennq nto this lease 
3 CLAIMS AGAINST SUPPLIER If Equipment is not properly installed does not operate a« represented or warranted by Supplier or is unsatisfactory for any reason 
Lessee shall make any claim on account thereof solely against Supplier and shall nevertheless pay Lessor all rent payable under this tease Lessor wi l l include as a con 
dit ion of its p u r c h a v order that Supplier agree that all warranties agreements and representations if any which may be made by Supplier to Lessor may be enforced by 
Lessee m its own name Lessor hereby agrees to assign to Lessee and does hereby assign solely for the purpose of making and prosecuting any said claim all of the rights 
which Lessor has against Supplier *or breach of warranty or other representation respecting Equipment 
4 SUPPLIER NOT AN AGENT Lessee understands and agrees tnat neither Supplier nor any salesman or other agent ot Suopl er s an agent o* Lessor and that Lessor 
is not an agent o> Suopi er No salesman or agent of Supplier is authorised to waive or alter any erm or cond Hon of th s lease ma no reoresemat on as 10 Equ pment or any 
other rna'fer by Suppl er shall n 3ny way affect Lessee s duty fo pay the rent, and perform ts other obligations 3S set 'ortn n this ease 
5 ORDERING EQUIPMENT Lessee hereby requests Lessor to purchase the Equipment from the above named Suppl iers) Lessor agrees to purchase the Equipment as 
selected by Lesser* and Lessee agrees to arrange for delivery of the Equipment so that it can be accepted on or before the commencement date of this ease as set forth in 
paragraph 1 above Lessee hereby authorizes Lessor to insert m this lease the commencement date identification numbers and other descriptive data for the Equipment 
6 AGREEMENT INCLUDES REVERSE SIOE HEREOF This lease including the reverse side hereof correctly sets forth the entire lease agreement between Lessor and 
Lessee and no agreement or understanding claimed by either party hereto shall be binding unless specifically set forth herein The term Lessee as used herein shall mean 
and nclude any and all Lessees who sign hereunder ea«*h of whom shall be jointly and severally bound hereby 
7 NO WARRANTIES BY LESSOR LESSEE HAS SSLECTEO BOTH ( J I EQUIPMENT AND (b> SUPPLIER FROM WHOM LESSOR 'S TQ PURCHASE IT LESSOR MAKES 
NO WARRANTIES EXPRESS OR MPLIEO AS TO ANY MATTER VHAr fOEVER INCLUDING THE CQNCITIQN JF c Q l PMENT *S ^  C R C H A \ T M 3 I L I T V OR ITS FITNESS 
FOR ANY PART LULAR o JPPQSE ANO AS TQ LESSOR ESSEE EASES EQUP* ENT AS IS 
THIS LEASE ALSO INCLUDES ALL TERMS AND PROVISIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF 
THIS LEASE CANNOT BE CANCELLED BY LESSEE. 
LESSfiB _ *l£SSEg (Authorized Signature 4 Title) 
ft .j 0. &J>tkl^ PRESIDENT 
Date. Executed by Lessee 
Date Accepted 
Le«®« » Social Security Number > 
AUGUST 2 6 , 1981 
Emplcver s I D Number 82-0210551 
•(If Corporation, President, Vice President or 
Treasurer should sign and give official title. If 
Proprietor or Partner, state which) 
EXHIBIT A 
SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT NM^E OF LESSEE 
BLACKER APPLIANCE & FURNITURE 
OF CALDWELL INC. 
5023 EAST CLEVELAND 
CALDWELL, IDAHO 83605 
QUANITY SERIAL NO. EQUIPMENT.DESCRIPTION, MAKE, MODEL NO. 
ONE C10128K PACKAGED COMPUTER SYSTEM WHICH INCLUDES 
16 bit central processor unit; 128Kb mos memory 
real time clock, power fail/auto restart, 
assembly interface, hardware mult/divide, auto 
program load, 12.5 mb nonremovable dis, 1.25mb 
discette, CRTmaster console, 200 cps printer, I/O 
communications subassembly, Multiple language 
interface, four line full or half duplex asyncr. mux, 
printer port, TTY port, Applications interface, and 30 
cabinet w/formica desk top and casters. 5 user 
capability. 
LESSOR: 
COPPER STATS LEASING CO. 
BY />< v. ^w4sa/>^_ 
TITLF 
LfiLd tw-
TT^LF PRESIDENT 
D A T r AUCUST 261 1981 
LEASE NO. 
ADDENDUM NO. 6 
salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
COMMERCIAL LEASE 
' ' i ' 3 - O l 
(ALWAYS REFER TO ABOVE NO ) 
LEASE AGREEMENT made and entered into this ' day of 19 ° * . by and between Copper State Leasing C o , a Utah 
corporation with offices at 359 South Mam Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, (Lessor) and (Lessee) 
r»T > f " * * nn~ "" ,r»r»•", 
^ f ' ^ r * ' -;; » 
5^ _2_3___^ _>_!1!J!_ r ) * . ^ " f f T * 
* 
•r» 
r ? T , T , ^ ^ w , . , „ T , „ 
C A V r e - T / i , - . M P O , T ^ > -
Lessor hereby leases to Lessee, and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor the following described personal property (the Equipment) upon the following 
terms and conditions 
SERIAL NO EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION SUPPLIER NAME AJMO ADDRESS 
SHE ATTACHED
 xSXyi3IT "A" 
£^]See Exhibit A consisting of pages attached hereto and a pan hereof 'or Quantity Serial Numbers Description Supplier and other Equipment 
information 
The Equipment will at all times during the term of this lease be located at the address of Lessee shown above or at 
ACCEPTANCE OF EQUIPMENT AND APPROVAL FOR PAYMENT OF INVOICES " t , J / w J j t 
The aoove equipment leased from you by the undersigned under the terms of the above-referenced lease has been delivered to the -undersigned in 
good condition and repair The undersigned accepts the equipment as satisfactory in all respects for the purpose of the lease The undersigned has 
examined the invoice of the vendor for the equipment and specifically requests you to pay the amount of such invoice 
The undersigned further acknowledges that you have made no express or implied warranties or representations^ lo.thV/merchant-
ability quality design condition or fitness for any parjicular purpose of the leased property and approves the^payment^of All invoices 
relating to this equipment 
If decals or metal plates have been supplied they have been affixed to the equipment listed above. 
Disburse money to Cowboy Computer prior to delivery of commiter. 
We understand that this will initiate the lease and payments 
which will start one month from date of funding. 
This acceptance and delivery must 
be completed and signed and relumed 
to Copper State Leasing Co before payment 
can be made to supplier. 
f d£ /^/^SSIDENT 
LEASE-COPY 
Letee. (a) ess * ( ) . 
I / , — ' ^ COMMB 
,^<Zrt Act 
ERCIAL 
ADDENDUM NO. 7 
Cowboy Computers LTD 
Suite 202 
619 North State St. 
Chicago, IT 60610 
INVOICE INVOICt NO 
2539 
LD TO SHIP TO 
Copper State Leasing 
359 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111 
Blacker's Home Furnishings 
5023 E. Cleveland Blvd. 
Caldwell
 t Td. 836(15 
Attn: Jim Blacker 
USTOMER S ORDER 
"i"m\(/t, -Y.'Trf ~if~te ? • *-""<'*-** 
1 
SALE5MAN TERMS SHIPPED VIA 
Best W a y , P a d d e d Van 
rl 0 1 2 8 k P a c k a g e d C o m p u t e r S v s t e m w h i c h i n c l u d e s 
16 bit c e n t r a l p r o c e s s o r u n i t ; 128kb m o s m e m o r v 
real time cl 
a s s e m b l y int 
au t o p r o g r a m 
1 . 2 5 m h ri i <; r 
pri 
Mill 
hal 
App 
o c k , p o w e r 
1oad , 12 . 
e t t e . C R T 
ncer, I/O communica 
tipl e_lanauaae inte 
f duplex 
1 i c a t i o n s 
desk top and 
asyncr. mu 
i n t e r f a c e 
c a s t e r s . 
f a i 1 / a u t o r e s t a r t , 
r d w a r e m u l t / d i v i d e . 
5 mb n o n r e m o v a b l e d i s k , 
m a s t e r c o n s o l e , 20D cps 
tions s u b a s s e m b l y , 
rf ace , f o u r 1 i ne fill 1 or . 
x, p r i n t e r p o r t , TTY por t 
, and 3 0" c a b i n e t w / f o r m i 
5 u s e r c a p a b i 1 i ty. 
/n Yoo^>r^/ 
F O B 
Ship P o i n t 
> 
:a 
Total 
DATE 
6-15-
42,000 
81 
n 
ADDENDUM NO. 8 
SSOAJLMCZSSSG** > :S»S^taT»*^»5E=*3C«SZPS*£aGre^^ 
359 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
,» ' _ " w ' - t ' >* » * * - ' * I ' ^ i ' - C*"'" ' 
rr.HHTii SCl.-rH OFFICE 
P,a-Jl' t»uC««UTV Li.N.%.< O r UTAH 
SALT LAKkl CITY. UTAH d-*liO 
3M/1240 
PAY_ 
•v* \;r;'!:r.;':* \ . - ' . .- ' ' ; 0 0 - 2 3 - 3 1 
COWBOY COMPUTERS' LTD1/::".J-J'", ,v' . .,' '• •*' 
A M O U N T 
:$ 4 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
RDER 
OF \s;^y-
O M O T NfEGT3Tf7flc&UE 
GST«**Lr-2*aa. 1 • *i-JS&ti\i*J!l mXLiZZZZ*.* a w . ; . t z - . c i * • » ' • ' * • 
V Rocky Uowniain 0«nk Nou 
SZSS^LBJl^Sra^l * KS'-atftSt^sCV > ^ * «(1^.^*^.111 >«^  a ^ * • aTr-Sl^r** * -»<Li£T5«^  «* «JN 
A Y E E DETACH THIS STATEMENT BEFORE DEPOSITING 
INVOICE NO D E S C R I P T I O N DISCOUNT OH DEDUCTION 
•28-81 LEASE # 1 6 6 5 - 0 1 
BLACKER APPLIANCE & FURNITURE 
OF CALDWELL, IiTC. 
2 0 1 - 1 
CSL 
4 2 , 0 
ADDENDUM NO. 9 
m 
V^V_Jt »• I 
.7 ^ ' 
™ VJVdT 
RICHARD CRANDALL 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
OCT 31 1984 
SS^ '™' * * c J^ r d D , s ' coo-
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY 
A Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMENDED ORDER FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT" 
BLACKER APPLIANCE & FURNITURE 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation; 
KYLE BLACKER, JAMES BLACKER, 
and T.C. BLACKER, individually, 
BLACKER FURNITURE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; GARY BLACKER, 
FRED BLACKER and RICK BLACKER, 
individually, 
Defendants and 
Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN GRAY and EDWARD GRAVEN, 
Third-Party Defendants, 
Civil No. C-82-5825 
*and"-C=8T=5F25~ ' 
Upon motion of the plaintiff and good cause appearing 
therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Court's previous Order granting summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants is hereby vacated and the Court enters the following 
Amended Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count 
I of the Complaint is granted. 
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Jugdment insofar 
as it goes to Count II of the plaintiff's -Complaint is denied. 
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
Count I of its Complaint is denied. 
DATED this 3 / day of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT 
J^jaes ~S . S away a 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
* * ^ s 
Approved as to Form: 
Gaylen S. Youi^ g, Jr. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Blacker Furniture & Appliance 
and Blacker Furniture Company 
*fe 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Clerk 
Deputy Clerk 
- 2 -
ADDENDUM NO. 1 0 
Gaylen S. Young, Jr77^1^3^ 
Attorney for Defendants 
201 Dixon Building 
2188 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
486-5673 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, § 
a Utah corporation, 
§ 
Plaintiff, 
§ 
vs. 
§ 
BLACKER APPLIANCE & FURNITURE 
COMPANY, an Idaho corporation; § 
KYLE BLACKER, JAMES BLACKER, 
and T.C. BLACKER, individually; § 
BLACKER FURNITURE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; GARY BLACKER, § 
FRED BLACKER and RICH BLACKER, 
individually, § 
Defendants and § 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
§ 
vs. 
JOHN GRAY and EDWARD GRAVEN, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
§ 
THIS CASE, having come on regularly for trial on the 
15th day of May, 19 85, before the above entitled Court, the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge presiding; both Plaintiffs and 
Defendants being present, along with their attorneys, Jeffery M. 
Jones for Plaintiff and Gaylen S. Young, Jr. for the Defendants; 
and the matter having been fully presented, argued and submitted 
to the Court; and the Court being fully advised in the premises, 
".' 41985 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C82-5825 
and 
Civil No. C82-5826 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
15^  
now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not sustained 
its burden to prove by perponderance of the evidence (or by clear 
and convincing evidence) its claims and allegations of the Second 
Cause of Action. 
2. That Defendants did not knowingly and/or with 
intent to deceive, authorize John Gray, Edward Graven, or any of 
their entities to use the funds coming from Plaintiff, in an in-
vestment scheme, in which Plaintiff had no knowledge. 
3. That Defendants did not willfully and intentionally 
omit to disclose to the Plaintiff that the funds that Plaintiff 
had delivered to John Gray and Eward Graven, or their entities, 
for the purchase of computers, were not, in fact, being used to 
purchase the computers, as said Defendants themselves had no such 
knowledge. 
4. That John Gray and/or Edward Graven and/or any of 
their entities were not^the agents of Defendants in connection 
with the use of the funds that were paid over to the said John 
Gray and Edward Graven from Plaintiff that went into the invest-
ment scheme of the said John Gray, Edward Graven or their entities 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF 1AW 
1. A judgment should be entered in the Second Cause of 
Action in the above entitled case in favor of the Defendants and 
against the Plaintiff, no cause of action. 
- 2 -
2. That Defendant should be entitled to recover their 
costs incurred herein. 
DATED this 4^ daY o f June, 1985. 
BY THE COURTS 
Savleh S. Yo 
Judge James S. Sa#&ya 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Clerk 
G yle 
Attorney for defendants 
£eputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to Jeffrey Jl. Jones, Attorney for Plaintiff, 
135 South State, Suite 450, Salt Lake City, UT 34111 on this 
"ft 
%0- day of A\3V 1985 
-*&T Jf^f , / 
- 3 - 4*5= • 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 1 
Gaylen S. Young, Jr., #3533 
Attorney for Defendants 
201 Dixon Building 
2138 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
436-5673 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, § 
a Utah corporation, 
S 
Plaintiff, 
§ 
vs. 
§ 
BLACKER APPLIANCE & FURNITURE 
COMPANY, an Idaho corporation; § 
KYLE BLACKER, JAMES BLACKER, 
and T.C. BLACKER, individually; 5 
BLACKER FURNITURE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; GARY BLACKER, <> 
FRED BLACKER and RICH BLACKER, 
individually, § 
Defendants and § 
Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, § 
vs. § 
JOHN GRAY and EDWARD GRAVEN, 5 
Third-Party § 
Defendants. 
„ _ _ § 
THIS CASE, having come on regularly for trial on the 
15th day of May, 1985, before the above entitled Court, the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya,Judge, presiding; both Plaintiffs and 
Defendants being present, along v/ith their attorneys, Jeffrey M. 
Jones for Plaintiff and Gaylen S. Young, Jr. for the Defendants; 
and the matter having been fully presented, argued and submitted 
to the Court; and the Court being- fully advised in the premises, 
^ cz 
4 1985 
^ J ^ ~ H,rr.«:v r > r k 3rd C/ / C o r 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C82-5825 
and 
Civil No. CS2-5826 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
and the Court having made, signed and filed its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and upon Motion of Defendants herein; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
1. That Judgment is hereby entered on the Second Cause 
of Action in the above entitled case, in favor of the Defendants 
and against the Plaintiff, no cause of action. 
DATED this <£ day of June, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
ge Janes S. Sawayir 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Clerk 
Attorney for Defendants 
L4 » / 
^>puty Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Judgment was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Jeffrey 11. 
Jones, Attorney for Plaintiff, 135 South State Street, Suite 450, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this Sc * day of Saasre, 1985. 
Jd. %^( 11 
'ft c : 
